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Abstract
We construct a research and development (R&D) based endogenous growth model
with exhaustible resources and investigate whether protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPR) can sustain perpetual growth. We show that relatively weak IPR
protection is sucient to sustain perpetual growth when goods production is more
resource-intensive, whereas relatively strong IPR protection is needed for perpetual
growth if production is less resource-intensive. If the resource intensity in goods
production is medium, even the strictest IPR protection cannot sustain perpet-
ual growth when the quality improvements brought about by innovations are small
enough. In this case, we nd that R&D subsidies can complement IPR protection
in sustaining perpetual growth. We derive the socially optimal level of IPR protec-
tion, which is increasing in the resource intensity of goods production. Furthermore,
we also consider a case where resource is essential for R&D activities and show a
knife-edge condition for perpetual growth.
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1 Introduction
Technological change has been considered as one of the most important factors for eco-
nomic growth, whereas scarcity of exhaustible resources has been considered as one of
the barriers to economic growth. Because these opposing factors have a strong rela-
tion via energy price changes, a growing number of studies have focused on economic
growth in the presence of exhaustible resources.1 Theoretically, some authors, such as
Stiglitz (1974), use models where the technological growth rate is exogenously given to
examine the technological growth rate that overcomes the scarcity of exhaustible re-
sources. Studies such as Barbier (1999) employ endogenous growth models to address
the same issue. These studies usually assume that the intellectual property rights (IPR)
of innovators of new technologies are perfectly protected; therefore, research rms have
sucient incentives for research and development (R&D) activities. However, in the
real world, newly developed technologies are often imitated and IPR protection is im-
perfect. Then, there are global movements to enforce stronger IPR protection. Since the
agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), all World
Trade Organization (WTO) member countries adopted a set of minimum standard on
IPRs There are some countries that have much stricter related laws on IPR protection.
If IPR protection were too weak, no one would engage in R&D activities, resulting in
technical progress becoming too slow to overcome the increasing resource scarcity. The
main purpose of the present study is to examine IPR protection policies that overcome
the scarcity of exhaustible resources and realize perpetual output growth. On the other
hand, perpetual growth does not necessarily imply socially optimal allocation. There-
fore, we are also interested in how the presence of exhaustible resources inuences the
welfare eects of IPR protection policies.
Assuming that an exhaustible resource is an essential production factor as in Stiglitz
(1974), Barbier (1999), and others, we construct a simple quality-ladder Schumpeterian
growth model (cf. Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Chapter 4), where the technological
growth rate is endogenously determined. In our model, a single nal good is produced by
using intermediate goods. To produce the intermediate goods, rms in the intermediate
good sector must employ labor and resources. Research rms conduct R&D activities.
If a rm succeeds in its R&D activities, the quality of its intermediate good is improved.
Assuming that the IPRs of successful innovators are protected legally by a patent, we
examine IPR protection policies that overcome resource scarcity. The present paper
considers the following two models; (i) labor is the only input in the R&D sector, and
(ii) the exhaustible resource is essential for R&D activities. We show that these two
models lead to quite dierent conclusions.2
In the model where labor is the only input in the R&D sector, we obtain the following
results. First, strengthening IPR protection has two opposing eects on perpetual output
growth. On the one hand, it stimulates R&D activities, which has a positive eect on
growth. On the other, stronger IPR protection leads to exhaustible resources getting
scarcer at a higher rate, which negatively aects the growth rate. Because the former
eect dominates the latter, stronger IPR protection increases the growth rate. Second,
1According to the well-known Hotelling rule, the price of an exhaustible resource grows at the rate
that equals the interest rate. Furthermore, empirical studies such as Popp (2002) show that an increase
in energy prices stimulates technological change in industries that use these resources.
2Although capital accumulation has the potential to overcome resource scarcity, we abstract it because
empirical studies such as Easterly and Levine (2001) point out that technical progress, rather than capital
accumulation, is the main driving force of economic growth.
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there exists a minimum level of IPR protection that is required to attain perpetual output
growth. The minimum level of IPR protection depends on the resource intensity in goods
production. Stiglitz (1974) shows that as the resource intensity gets higher, more rapid
productivity growth is required to overcome increasing resource scarcity. Then, one may
conjecture that IPR protection must be strong to sustain perpetual output growth if
goods production is relatively resource-intensive. Contrary to this conjecture, we show
that when production is suciently resource-intensive, relatively weak IPR protection is
sucient for perpetual growth, whereas if the resource intensity in goods production is
suciently low, perpetual growth is possible only in the presence of relatively stronger
IPR protection. This result arises because relatively high resource intensity in goods
production implies relatively low demand for labor. Then, as the equilibrium wage rate
becomes low, R&D activities increase because of decreased labor costs.
Third, depending on the resource intensity in goods production, IPR protection may
not sustain perpetual output growth. Specically, when the resource intensity in goods
production is medium in level, even the strongest IPR protection cannot sustain perpet-
ual growth if each innovation brings about a small quality improvement. In this case, in
addition to suciently strong IPR protection, an R&D subsidy is needed. The present
model shows that the subsidy must be introduced in the presence of IPR protection be-
cause the R&D subsidy alone does not stimulate R&D activities. Therefore, by setting
suciently high subsidy rates and suciently strong IPR protection, perpetual growth
can be sustained. The nal result in the model where labor is the only input in the
R&D sector is related to welfare analysis. The resource intensity in goods production
aects the optimal IPR protection that maximizes social welfare. More precisely, as
goods production becomes more resource intensive, the socially optimal level of IPR
protection tends to be stronger.
If the exhaustible resource is essential for R&D activities, quite dierent results are
obtained. Only when both the IPR protection policy and the subsidy rate satisfy a
rather knife-edge condition, the perpetual output growth is possible. Then, for each set
of economic parameter values, the policy maker has to accurately control the strength
of IPR protection and the subsidy rate. Furthermore, if the initial stock of the ex-
haustible resource is small enough, the knife-edge condition is never satised regardless
of the strength of IPR protection and the subsidy rate. Therefore, in this case, the IPR
protection policy and the R&D subsidy cannot sustain perpetual growth.
Literature also has pointed out that parameter values associated with resource-
productivity growth and resource intensity are important for perpetual growth. In
exogenous growth models with innitely-lived agents, studies like Stiglitz (1974) show
that when the resource intensity in goods production is high, suciently high productiv-
ity growth is required to sustain perpetual growth. In an overlapping-generations model
with exogenous productivity growth, Agnani et. al. (2005) obtain the similar results.
However, because productivity growth rates are exogenously given, these studies do not
examine how to realize such high productivity growth.
Many authors have considered the role of exhaustible resources in endogenous growth
models. For example, Barbier (1999), Scholz and Ziemes (1999), and Grimaud and
Rouge (2003, 2005) construct R&D-based endogenous growth models with exhaustible
resources similar to our models. These studies derive the condition for perpetual growth
and then show that the condition depends on preference and technology parameters
including the resource intensity, as in exogenous growth models. Barbier (1999) and
Scholz and Ziemes (1999) do not conduct any policy analyses. These studies then cannot
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answer what policies to be conducted to sustain perpetual growth when the model
parameters do not satisfy the condition for perpetual growth. Grimaud and Rouge
(2003, 2005) conduct policy analyses, focusing on the R&D subsidy and the tax on
the resource use but paying no attention to IPR protection. Their main purpose is to
characterize the policies that implement optimal allocations. In contrast, by explicitly
modeling IPR protection, we nd that the R&D subsidy alone cannot sustain perpetual
growth because it has no impact on R&D activities in the absence of IPR protection.
In addition, our model shows that the socially optimal IPR protection is increasing in
the resource intensity.
More recently, some authors suppose multiple sectors to consider the direction of
technical change and transformation of industrial structure. Extending the model of
directed technical change developed by Acemoglu (2002), Di Maria and Valente (2008)
construct a model where there are two nal good sectors with dierent resource inten-
sities.3 They show that under some condition, the long-run growth rate of the economy
is determined by the growth rate of the resource intensive sector alone. Constructing a
model similar to Di Maria and Valente (2008), Pittel and Bretschger (2010) show that
dierent resource intensities of the two sectors have exactly the same negative impact
on the long-run growth rate of the economy (see equations (33) and (34) in their paper).
Bretschger and Smulders (2012) also obtain the similar results in a model of structural
change. Thus, even in the models of directed technical change or structural change,
the long-run growth rate of economy is determined in manners similar to those of mod-
els that do not incorporate directed technical change or structural change. Therefore,
our paper models a single nal good but derives an analogous condition for perpetual
growth.
Most of existing studies on growth and exhaustible resources assume that the ex-
haustible resource is not needed in R&D activities. In contrast, we consider the situation
where the exhaustible resource is essential for R&D activities. In general, R&D activities
often require inputs that are produced using exhaustible resources, such as electricity.4
Therefore, it is signicant to study a model where the exhaustible resource is needed in
R&D activities. Besides, the existing literature on IPR protection does not investigate
its role in an economy that faces resource scarcity.5 In contrast, our study sheds light on
IPR protection and whether it can overcome the resource scarcity and drive perpetual
growth.
The present paper assumes that the IPR of innovators is protected legally by a
patent. Broadly speaking, there are two policy instruments regarding patents: patent
length and patent breadth.6 Depending on their purposes, some authors focus on these
instruments separately, whereas others consider both in one model.7 The present paper
analyzes the eects of patent breadth, assuming innite patent length. There are two
3Acemoglu et al. (2012) also construct a directed technical change model with exhaustible resource.
However, their focus is mainly on the environmental quality, rather than the role of exhaustible resource.
4According to U.S. Energy Information Administration, 79% of world total generation of electricity
in kWh was produced with exhaustible resources including fossil fuels and nuclear in 2011.
5For example, see Judd (1985), Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003), O'Donoghue
and Zweimuller (2004), and Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008).
6Patent length is the length of time for which a patent is valid. Patent breadth prohibits imitation
of patentees' products by rms that do not have the patent.
7Authors such as Judd (1985), Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008), and Iwaisako and Futagami (2003)
consider patent length in dynamic general equilibrium models without exhaustible resources. Goh and
Olivier (2002) and O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) introduce patent breadth in endogenous growth
models without exhaustible resources.
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reasons for focusing on patent breadth. First, empirical evidence shows that most patents
are replaced by new products and become obsolete before the end of their legal patent
life (cf. Manseld, 1984). This evidence suggests that patent breadth matters more
than patent length in practice. Second, our assumption of innite patent length makes
it simpler to examine how the presence of exhaustible resources aects the socially
optimal patent policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 constructs an R&D-
based endogenous growth model with exhaustible resources, where labor is the only
input in R&D activities. Section 3 derives the equilibrium. Section 4 examines whether
IPR protection policies can sustain perpetual growth. Section 5 conducts welfare anal-
ysis. Section 6 introduces R&D subsidies into the benchmark model and reexamines
a condition for perpetual growth. Section 7 considers a model where the exhaustible
resource is essential for R&D activities. Section 8 presents our concluding remarks.
2 The Model
As in Stiglitz (1974) and other authors, we assume that an exhaustible natural resource
is an essential production factor. In order to examine the IPR protection policies that
sustain positive long-run growth, we endogenize technical change, following the endoge-
nous growth model proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1991), where the qualities of
intermediate goods are improved through R&D activities.
2.1 Households and Exhaustible Resources
Time is continuous and denoted as t  0. The economy is populated by identical
households. The population size is normalized to be one. The lifetime utility of the
representative household at time t is given by Ut =
R1
t
c 1 
1  e
 ( t)d , where ct is
consumption at time t,  > 0 is the subjective discount rate, and  > 0 is the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.8 Because most of the empirical evidence
suggests that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively small, we restrict
our attention to the case where  > 1. At each moment of time, the representative
household inelastically supplies L(> 0) unit of labor and sell Rt( 0) units of the
exhaustible resource. The budget constraint of the representative household is given by
_at = rtat + wtL   ct + pR;tRt, where at is the asset holdings, rt is the interest rate,
wt is the wage rate, and pR;t is the price of the resource at time t. The price of the
consumption good is normalized to one. The stock of the exhaustible resource at time t
is St > 0. Because the resource is not renewable, the following two constraints must be
satised: _St =  Rt and limT!1 ST  0. The representative household maximizes the
lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint, these two constraints on the exhaustible
resource, and the No-Ponzi game condition, limT!1 aT e 
R T
t rudu  0. This yields _ct =
(rt   )ct= and the familiar Hotelling rule:
_pR;t = rtpR;t: (1)
In addition, the following two transversality conditions must be satised: limT!1 aT cT e T =
0 and limT!1 ST = 0. The second transversality condition, together with _St =  Rt,
8If  = 1, the instantaneous utility function takes a logarithmic form; hence, the lifetime utility of
the representative household becomes Ut =
R1
t
(ln c )e
 ( t)d .
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implies
St =
Z 1
t
Rd: (2)
Following Stiglitz (1974) and others, we dene the resource extraction rate as Rt=St to
focus on the ratio of resource extraction to resource stock.
2.2 Production
There is a unit continuum of intermediate goods industries. Each intermediate good
industry is indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. If a rm succeeds in an innovation in industry j, the rm
can produce a new generation of product j. Then, each intermediate good is classied
by a number of generations, m = 0; 1; 2;    . We assume that products of dierent
generations have dierent qualities (or productivities). The quality (or productivity) of
product j of generation m is denoted as qj;m = 
m, where  > 1.
In the nal good sector, identical rms produce a single consumption good competi-
tively, by using intermediate goods as inputs. The number of rms is normalized to one.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), the technology of the representative rm in the
nal good sector is
lnYt =
Z 1
0
ln
"X
m
qj;mxj;m;t
#
dj; (3)
where Yt is the output and xj;m;t is the input of product j of generation m at time t.
Because each generation of product j is a perfect substitute for other generations of the
product, the nal good rm purchases the single generation ~mj;t that carries the lowest
quality-adjusted price, pj;m;t=qj;m, where pj;m;t is the price of product j of generation
m at time t. Then, from the prot maximization of the nal good rm, we obtain
xj;m;t = Yt=pj;m;t for m = ~mj;t and 0 otherwise. The good market equilibrium condition
is given by ct = Yt, which implies
_Yt =
1

(rt   )Yt: (4)
Each intermediate good of any generation is produced by using labor and the resource
as inputs. The production technology of product j of generation m is
xj;m;t = Al
1 
j;m;tR

j;m;t; (5)
where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter, A > 0 is the total factor productivity, and lj;m;t and
Rj;m;t are labor and resource inputs, respectively. The resource intensity is given by
. A large (small)  indicates strong (weak) dependence on exhaustible resources in
production. Letting A = [(1  )1  A] 1, we obtain the unit cost function from (5):
!(wt; pR;t) = Aw
1 
t p

R;t  !t: (6)
We model IPR protection next. If a rm succeeds in inventing a state-of-the-art
version of product j, it can take out a patent and supply the good monopolistically.
Following Goh and Olivier (2002), we assume that rms other than the innovator of
the latest-generation product may imitate the product at a constant per unit cost of
imitation. However, the existence of the patent legally defends the inventor against
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imitations. If inventors' IPR is perfectly protected and no rms can imitate the latest-
generation, the patentee of the state-of-the-art product charge a price, pj;t = !t =
(1 + m)!t, where m =    1 denotes the monopoly markup. If inventors' IPR is not
fully protected, the patentee of the state-of-the-art product is forced to charge a price
lower than (1 + m)!t. We measure the strength of the patent breadth by  2 [0; 1].
As in Goh and Olivier (2002), we assume that the maximum price that the inventor of
product j can charge is equal to pj;t = !t, where   (1 + m) 2 [1; ]. The following
discussion uses  2 [1; ] to measure the strength of IPR protection, instead of . The
patent breadth of  =  implies perfect IPR protection. Most studies on R&D-based
endogenous growth models focus on this case. When  = 1, there is no protection.
Patent breadth within the interval of (1; ) indicates partial IPR protection.
Under the patent policy described above, the patentee the state-of-the-art product
charges a price pj;t = !t  pt. The output and prots of product j of the latest
generation are, respectively,
xj;t =
Yt
!t
 xt; (7)
j;t =

1  1


Yt  t: (8)
From pt = !t, (7), and (8), all rms that produce the latest generation behave
symmetrically. Then, (3) can be written as Yt = e
Qt Al1 t Rt , where lt and Rt are the
labor and resource inputs of the representative state-of-the-art rm, respectively. The
term eQt  e
R 1
0 ln qj;tdj represents the productivity level whose growth rate is determined
endogenously, where qj;t is the state-of-the-art quality of product j at time t. Then,
our model is an endogenous growth version of Stiglitz's (1974) model without capital
accumulation.
2.3 R&D
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and most R&D-based endogenous growth
models with exhaustible resources, we assume that labor is the only input in R&D
activities. If an R&D rm devotes btdt units of labor for a time interval of dt to
R&D activities on product j, it succeeds in inventing a new-generation product j with
probability tdt, where b is a positive constant. Then, t represents the instantaneous
intensity of R&D activities at time t. If a rm succeeds in inventing a new generation of
product j, it can take out a patent for that generation. Let vt denote the market value
of a new invention. The expected prots of an R&D rm are vtdt   wtbtdt. Because
R&D intensity must be nite in equilibrium, we have
vt  bwt; with equality if t > 0: (9)
In addition, vt must satisfy the following no-arbitrage condition:
rtvt = _vt   tvt + t: (10)
2.4 Labor and Resource Markets
Each rm that produces a state-of-the-art product demands (@!t=@wt)xt units of labor
and (@!t=@pR;t)xt units of exhaustible resources. The labor demand of R&D rms
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equals bt. Using (6) and (7), the labor and resource market equilibrium conditions,
respectively, are given by
L =
@!t
@wt
xt + bt =
(1  )!t
wt
xt + bt =
(1  )Yt
wt
+ bt; (11)
Rt =
@!t
@pR;t
xt =
!t
pR;t
xt =
Yt
pR;t
: (12)
3 Equilibrium
We rst derive the dynamic system of the model economy. We dene Vt  Yt=vt. Vt is
a jump variable. From (4), (8), (10), and the denition of Vt, we have
_Vt
Vt
=
1

[(1  )rt   ]  t +    1

Vt: (13)
It is shown that t is a function of Vt.
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t =
(
L
b   1  Vt; if Vt < (1 )bL;
0; if Vt  (1 )bL:
(14)
Furthermore, we can show that rt satises the following relation:
10
rt =
(
(1 )( 1)
 Vt   (1    ln)t; if Vt < (1 )bL;
 ln
1 + t +
(1 )
1 + ; if Vt  (1 )bL;
(15)
where t is given by (14). Substituting (15) into (13) yields
_Vt
Vt
=
8<: 1 +
h
 1
 Vt   ( 1) ln+(1 +)1 + t   1 +
i
if Vt <

(1 )bL;
 1
 Vt   ( 1) ln+(1 +)1 + t   1 + ; if Vt  (1 )bL;
(16)
where t is given by (14). The dynamic system is composed of (14) and (16).
Using phase diagrams, we next derive the steady state equilibrium where Vt is con-
stant over time. Substituting _Vt = 0 into (16) yields
Vt =

   1
+ f(   1) ln+ (1  + )gt
1  +  : (17)
9We show that if Vt  L=f(1 )bg, t = 0 holds as follows: Suppose Vt  L=f(1 )bg. If t > 0,
(9) indicates L=f(1 )bg  Yt=vt = Yt=(bwt), which implies L  (1 )Yt=(wt). The last inequality
contradicts (11) and t > 0. Then, t = 0 must hold. When Vt < L=f(1  )bg, we can show t > 0 as
follows: If t = 0 holds, (9) and Vt < L=f(1  )bg indicate L=f(1  )bg > Yt=vt > Yt=(bwt), which
implies L < (1   )Yt=(wt) and contradicts (11). Then, we have t > 0. Solving (11) for t yields
t = L=b  (1  )Vt=.
10Using (7), we rewrite (3) as lnYt =
R 1
0
[ln qj;t+ lnYt  ln!t]dj, which implies ln!t =
R 1
0
(ln qj;t)dj.
Because tdt units of intermediate goods improve their quality for a time interval of length dt, we have
ln!t+dt =
R tdt
0
(lnqj;t)dj +
R 1
tdt
(ln qj;t)dj = t(ln)dt +
R 1
0
(ln qj;t)dj = t(ln)dt + ln!t. Then, as
dt! 0, we have _!t=!t = t ln. The last equation, together with (1) and (6), implies (1 ) _wt=wt+rt =
t ln. When Vt  (1 )bL, we have t = 0 from (14) and L = (1  )Yt=(wt) from (11). The second
equation and (4) imply _wt=wt = _Yt=Yt = (rt )=. If Vt < (1 )bL holds, we have t > 0 from (14) and
vt = bwt from (9). The last equation and (10) imply _wt=wt = _vt=vt = rt+t =vt = rt+t ( 1)Vt=.
The discussion so far, together with (1  ) _wt=wt + rt = t ln, implies (15).
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In Figure 1, we draw the graphs of (14) and (17). An intersection of the two graphs
corresponds to a steady state. The graph of (17) intersects with the vertical axis at
V   1 =f(1 )g1=+=(1 ) > 0. If V < L=f(1   )bg, which is equivalent to  > 1 +
=
1=+=(1 )
b
L  ()  1, the two graphs intersect at a point where  is strictly
positive (see Figure 1 (a)). An asterisk is used for a variable in the steady state. In
contrast, if   (), we have  = 0 as shown in Figure 1 (b). Because the steady
state is unstable, the economy is always in the steady state. We now can prove the next
proposition.
[Figure 1]
Proposition 1
The economy is always on the unique steady state, where the following hold:
 =
8<: 0; if   ();( 1+ 1 ) 1b L  
( 1+

1 )( 1)++ 1    1  ln
> 0; if  > ();
(18a)
_Rt
Rt
=  (   1)
 ln+ 
1  +    

R < 0; (18b)
Rt = 

RSt; (18c)
r =
R   
   1 > 0; (18d)
_Yt
Yt
=  ln  R  Y : (18e)
(Proof) Solving (14) and (17) yields (18a). In the steady state, labor allocated in the
intermediate goods sector is constant because _Vt = 0. Thus, Yt = e
Q Alt
1 Rt implies
_Yt=Yt = 
 ln+  _Rt=Rt. From (12), we have _Rt=Rt = _Yt=Yt   _pR;t=pR;t. Solving these
two equations, along with (4), yields (18b), (18d), and (18e). The inequality in (18d)
holds because R  1 + > . We obtain (18c) directly from (2). In equilibrium,
we have at = vt and hence _at=at = _ct=ct = (rt   )=. Then, it is easily shown that the
transversality condition, limT!1 aT cT e T = 0, is satised. 
From (18a), we know that rms conduct R&D activities only when the patent breadth
is sucient, such that  > () holds. Then, () represents the lower bound of the
patent breadth that ensures positive levels of R&D activities. If ()  , we have  = 0
for any  2 [1; ]. To avoid this, we assume ln > b=L, which ensures () <  because
() is a decreasing function that satises ()  (0) = 1 + b=L < 1 + ln < . The
last inequality holds because  > 1 and ln is a concave function of  with slopes less
than one for  > 1. In addition, the assumption ln > b=L ensures that the socially
optimal output growth rate, Y;opt, is strictly positive, as we will see in Section 5.
Before closing this section, we examine the eects of  on R&D activities, allocation
of exhaustible resources, and the output growth rate. Because a marginal change in 
does not aect  if  = 0, we assume  > (). Dierentiating  with respect to 
yields
sign

@
@

= sign

+
1  

  1  

ln

L
b
+



> 0:
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Because a large  implies a large t, rms have a strong incentive to engage in R&D
activities. Thus, stronger IPR protection stimulates R&D activities. Because  > 1,
when IPR protection is strengthened, the resource input decreases at a higher rate and
the extraction rate of the resource, Rt=St, increases (see (18b) and (18c)). The intuition
behind this result is simple. Stronger IPR protection increases the market value of
a new invention, vt. From (9), because labor demand of R&D rms increases, the
wage rate increases relative to the resource price. Then, the demand for the resource
relative to labor in the intermediate goods sector rises. Consequently, the extraction
rate, Rt=St, increases with IPR protection and the resource input decreases at a higher
rate. Remember that the price of the resource increases at the rate of interest (see (1)).
Because the resource gets scarcer at a higher rate when IPR protection is stronger, the
price of the resource also rises at a higher rate.
From (18e), we know that stronger IPR protection has two opposing eects on out-
put growth. An increase in  accelerates technical progress, thereby aecting output
growth positively. At the same time, stronger IPR protection increases the extraction of
exhaustible resources, which depresses growth. In the present model, the former eect
always dominates the latter as shown in the next equation:
@Y
@
=

1  (   1)
1  + 

(ln)
@
@
=
ln
1  + 
@
@
> 0:
The next proposition has been proved.
Proposition 2
Suppose  > (). Strengthening IPR protection stimulates R&D activities, raises
the extraction rate of exhaustible resources and the growth rate of resource price, and
promotes output growth.
4 Patent Breadth and Growth
This section examines whether patent policies can sustain perpetual growth. Stiglitz
(1974) and others show that as the resource intensity of goods production becomes
high, the growth rate of technology must be high in order to sustain positive growth.
Because R&D intensities increase with  in our model, one may conjecture that as the
resource intensity of goods production becomes higher, stronger IPR protection must be
required to sustain positive growth. This section examines the validity of this conjecture.
From (18e), we know that positive output growth is possible if and only if  ln >
R holds. If we use (18b), this inequality condition is rewritten as 
 ln > . Stiglitz
(1974) showed that positive output growth is achieved if the exogenous growth rate of
production technology is suciently large relative to the resource intensity in production.
Then, the condition,  ln > , is analogous to that of Stiglitz (1974). Unlike Stiglitz
(1974), the growth rate of technology,  ln, is endogenous in our model.
If exhaustible resources are not needed in production ( = 0), as long as R&D
intensity is strictly positive ( > 0), positive output growth can be attained. In contrast,
if exhaustible resources are essential in production ( > 0), a strictly positive level of
R&D activities does not necessarily sustain positive output growth. This is because the
increasing scarcity of exhaustible resources negatively aects output growth, which is
represented by the second term in (18e). To overcome rising resource scarcity, more
rapid technological improvement is needed to sustain positive growth.
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Solving  ln >  by using (18a), we know that perpetual output growth is possible
if and only if IPR protection is suciently strong, such that  is large enough to satisfy
 > 1 + (1  ) ln+ 
L
b ln  
 ^()   () :
The inequality ^()  () holds because  > ^() implies that  > 0. Because
^() depends on , the patent policy that sustains perpetual output growth is aected
by the resource intensity in goods production. When ^() < , perpetual growth
can be sustained if the government chooses  such that  2 (^(); ]. However, if
^()  , even the strictest IPR protection,  = , cannot sustain perpetual growth.
The magnitude relation between ^() and  is crucial. Before examining this relation,
we examine the properties of ^().
We can see that ^(0) = (0) = 1 + b=L(< 1 + ln < ) and ^(1) = (1) = 1,
which implies ^(0) > ^(1). The inequality ^(0) > ^(1), together with the continuity
of ^(), implies that if the resource intensity in goods production is suciently low,
relatively strong IPR protection is needed for perpetual growth; however, relatively
weak IPR protection is sucient for perpetual growth if goods production is suciently
resource-intensive.
To obtain further results, we dierentiate ^() with respect to , which yields
sign ^0() = sign (), where ()    Lb ln   [ln  1 + 2] + (1   ) ln +
(1  ) has the following properties:
0() =  2L
b

ln  (1  )b
L

< 0; (19a)
(0) =  L
b
ln [ln  1] +  ln =  L
b
ln

ln  1  b
L

; (19b)
(1) =  L
b

ln  b
L

[ln+ 1] < 0: (19c)
The inequalities in (19a) and (19c) hold because ln > b=L. If ln < 1 + b=L holds,
(0) is positive; therefore, there exists a unique ^ 2 (0; 1) such that (^) > (=)(<)0
holds if  < (=)(>)^. On the other hand, when ln > 1 + b=L is satised, (0) takes
a negative value. Hence, ^() is a decreasing function of . The next proposition is
thus derived.
Proposition 3
Suppose ln > b=L. Then, if the resource intensity in goods production is suciently
low, relatively strong IPR protection is needed for perpetual growth. However, if pro-
duction is suciently resource-intensive, relatively weak IPR protection is sucient for
perpetual growth. In addition, the following results are obtained:
(i) Suppose b=L < ln < 1 + b=L. If  < (>)^ holds, as production becomes more
resource-intensive, the degree of IPR protection that is required to sustain perpetual out-
put growth increases (decreases).
(ii) Suppose ln > 1+b=L. As production becomes more resource-intensive, the degree
of IPR protection that is required to sustain perpetual output growth decreases.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 3, we note that changes in  have
two opposing eects on output growth. First, increases in  stimulate R&D activities,
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which aects output growth positively. If the resource intensity of goods production is
relatively high, labor demand in the intermediate goods sector is relatively low, leading
to the wage rate, wt, becoming relatively low. Because the cost of R&D activities,
wt, is relatively low, rms tend to conduct R&D activities intensively even when IPR
protection is relatively weak. Second, increases in  aect output growth adversely,
because the negative growth eects due to the increasing scarcity of exhaustible resources
become stronger. When goods production is more resource-intensive, the rst eect
tends to dominate the second, as compared to the case where production is less resource-
intensive. Thus, when goods production is suciently resource-intensive, even relatively
weak IPR protection can sustain perpetual growth. Because a large  implies rapid
quality improvement given , the positive growth eect tends to increase with . When
 is large enough to satisfy ln > 1 + b=L, the positive eect always dominates the
negative one. Thus, the patent strength that sustains perpetual output growth, ^(),
decreases as the resource intensity in goods production, , increases. However, if  is
not as large, such that ln < 1 + b=L is satised, the negative eect dominates the
positive one for a small , whereas the positive eect is dominant when  is suciently
large. Therefore, ^() exhibits a hump-shaped pattern with respect to .
We now know the properties of ^(). Then, examining the magnitude relation
between ^() and , we know whether a patent policy can sustain perpetual growth, as
proved in the next proposition.
Proposition 4
(i) Suppose ln > 1+b=L, or b=L < ln < 1+b=L and 2 < eb=L b=L. Suciently
strong IPR protection can then sustain perpetual growth for any  2 [0; 1].
(ii) Suppose b=L < ln < 1 + b=L and 2 > eb=L   b=L. (a) If  is large enough,
suciently strong IPR protection can sustain perpetual growth for any  2 [0; 1]. (b)
If  is small enough, for  suciently close to ^ 2 (0; 1), even the strictest IPR pro-
tection cannot sustain perpetual growth. If  is suciently close to either zero or one,
suciently strong IPR protection can sustain perpetual growth.
(Proof) When  is large enough to satisfy ln > 1 + b=L, we have ^()  ^(0) < .
Then, perpetual growth can be sustained by suciently strong IPR protection. Next,
consider b=L < ln < 1 + b=L. In this case, it is shown that ^ decreases with .11
In addition, using (^) = 0, we obtain limln!b=L ^ = 1 and limln!1+b=L ^ = 0.
Then, as ln increases from b=L to 1 + b=L, ^ monotonically decreases from one to
zero. If we use (^) = 0, ^(^) can be written as ^(^) = 2^ + ln. Note that ^()
is maximized at  = ^. Then, if 2^ <    ln, we have ^() <  for all  2 [0; 1].
This implies that perpetual growth can be sustained by IPR protection for all  2 [0; 1].
However, if 2^ >   ln, we have ^(^) > . Then, for  suciently close to ^, even the
strictest IPR protection cannot sustain perpetual growth. As ln increases from b=L
to 1 + b=L, 2^ monotonically decreases from 2 to 0, whereas    ln increases from
eb=L b=L to e1+b=L  (1+b=L). Then, if 2 < eb=L b=L, we have ^() <  for all
 2 [0; 1]. Otherwise, there exists a unique ~ such that ^(^) > (<) holds for  < (>)~.
Then, if  > ~, perpetual growth can be sustained by suciently strong IPR protection.
In contrast, if  < ~, as long as  is close to ^, even the strictest IPR protection cannot
sustain perpetual growth. However, because we have ^(0) = 1 + b=L < 1 + ln < 
11Rearranging (^) = 0, we know that ^ satises ^(^) = 2^ + ln. Totally dierentiating this
equation yields ^0(^)d^  (1 )(+
L
b )
[L
b
ln ]2 d ln = d ln+ 2d^: Because of ^
0(^) = 0, the above equation
implies d^=d ln < 0.
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and ^(1) = 1 < , suciently strong IPR protection can then sustain perpetual growth
when  is suciently close to either zero or one. 
Proposition 4 suggests that when the resource intensity in goods production is
medium in level, even the strictest IPR protection cannot sustain perpetual growth if 
is relatively small. However, if the resource intensity is suciently high or suciently
low, perpetual growth can be sustained by IPR protection, even when  is relatively
small. Figure 2 presents a numerical example of the range of  for which even the
strictest IPR protection cannot sustain perpetual growth.12 As we analytically show in
Proposition 4, if  is of medium magnitude, perpetual growth cannot be realized even
under the strictest IPR protection when  is small.
[Figure 2]
5 Welfare
This section derives the patent policy that maximizes social welfare and examine how
this optimal patent policy is aected by the presence of exhaustible resources. It is
rather easy to examine the welfare eects of patent policy in the present model, because
there are no transitional dynamics and the economy always stays in the steady state
equilibrium. For simplicity, we normalize the quality of the initial generation of any
product to one, that is, qj;0 = 1. Then, we have Yt = Y0e
Y t = ( Al1 R0 )e

Y t, where
l = L b represents labor allocated to the production of intermediate goods. Because
ct = Yt holds in equilibrium, social welfare is expressed as
U0 =
( Al1 R0 )1 
1  
1
+ (   1)Y
=
A1 S0
1  
l(1 )(1 )
R1 +0
; (20)
where R0 is obtained by substituting t = 0 into (18c).
13 In the second equality of (20),
we use (18d), (18e), and (18c). Because  > 1 is assumed, we have U0 < 0. The above
equation shows that the patent policy, , aects social welfare through its eects on the
allocation of labor and exhaustible resources. Because 1    < 0 and 1    +  > 0,
increases in l and R0 have positive eects on social welfare.
To derive the socially optimal level of R&D activities, we rst dierentiate U with
respect to  by using (18c) and l = L b. We then obtain @U=@ = Z()(1 )U0,
where
Z() =
1  + 
(   1) ln+  ln 
(1  )b
L  b :
Because (1   )U0 is positive, @U0=@ has the same sign as Z(). It is clear that
we have Z 0() < 0. The second derivative of U0 has a negative sign: @2U0=@2 =
Z()2(1  )2U0 + Z 0()(1   )U0 < 0. The last inequality holds because U0 < 0 and
Z 0() < 0. Then, social welfare is maximized if Z() = 0. We denote the socially
optimal level of R&D activities as opt. Solving Z(
) = 0 yields
opt =

1 +
(1  )(1  )


L
b
  (1  )
 ln
:
12In Figure 2, we assume that  = 0:05, b = 8, and L = 1. Under these parameter values, we have
eb=L   b=L = 1:0918 < 2.
13Note that U0 is bounded because + (   1)Y = f(   1) ln+ g=(1  + ) > 0.
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It is clear that @opt=@ > 0. The assumption ln > b=L ensures optj=0 = (L ln  
b)=(b ln) > 0, which implies opt > 0 for all  2 [0; 1]. Substituting opt into (18e)
yields the optimal output growth rate as follows: Y;opt =
+ 1 

1 +
 
L ln
b   

> 0: The
assumption, ln > b=L, ensures that the optimal output growth rate is strictly positive.
We are now in a position to derive the socially optimal level of IPR protection, opt.
Because the assumption ln > b=L ensures Y;opt > 0 for all  2 [0; 1], opt must be
larger than ^(). If there exists a  2 [^(); ] such that  = opt(> 0), we can nd
opt by solving 
 = opt for . However, if we have opt >  for all  2 [^(); ], we
have opt = . The discussion so far yields opt = min
n
; ~opt()
o
, where
~opt()  + ln+ L ln
(   1)L ln+ b:
Thus, ~opt() increases in . The socially optimal IPR protection depends on the
resource intensity and we have @opt=@  0. In particular, if  > 1 is small enough to
satisfy  > ~opt(0)  ln+ L ln( 1)L ln+b , there exists a unique  2 (0; 1], such that we
have opt = ~opt() and @opt=@ > 0 for  < . The next proposition is derived.
Proposition 5
Suppose ln > b=L. The socially optimal level of IPR protection tends to increase as
production becomes more resource-intensive.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is simple. High resource intensity implies that
utility depends largely on the resource input via the production processes of consumption
goods. Then, social optimality requires a high extraction rate of the resource, Rt=St.
Proposition 2 shows that the extraction rate of the resource increases with . Therefore,
the socially optimal level of IPR protection tends to be higher as production becomes
more resource-intensive.
6 R&D Subsidies
We have shown that when the resource intensity in goods production is medium in
level, even the strictest IPR protection cannot sustain perpetual growth if the quality
increment brought about by innovations, , is relatively small. This section considers
whether other policies complement or replace IPR protection. Can these policies sustain
perpetual output growth for all parameter values?
To examine these questions, we now shed light on an R&D subsidy, which corresponds
to a subsidy on labor input for R&D activities in our model.14 Thus, the expected prots
of an R&D rm are as follows: vttdt   wtb(1   s)btdt, where s 2 [0; 1) is the subsidy
rate. We suppose that a lump-sum tax on households nances this subsidy. As in the
benchmark model, the economy is always on the unique steady state. In the presence
of R&D subsidies, the R&D intensity in the steady state is given by
s =
8<: 0; if   s(; s);( 1+ 1 ) 1b L (1 s) 
( 1+

1 )( 1)+(1 s)(+ 1    1  ln)
> 0; if  > 
s
(; s);
(21)
14We retain the notations and assumptions made in the benchmark model.
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where 
s
(; s)  1 + =1=+=(1 ) (1 s)bL is the lower bound of the patent breadth for
positive R&D activities. Here, we use the subscript s to indicate the presence of R&D
subsidies. Replacing  by s in (18b){(18e), we can obtain the steady state variables,
rs , Rs, and 

Y s, and the extraction rate Rt=St. By dierentiating 

s and s(; s)
with respect to s, we obtain @s=@s > 0 and @s=@s < 0. Then, the R&D subsidy
complements IPR protection by stimulating R&D activities. However, (21) shows that
in the absence of IPR protection ( = 1), R&D activities do not occur for any s 2 (0; 1).
Therefore, the subsidy must be used along with the IPR protection policy to stimulate
R&D activities.
We can easily show that in the presence of the R&D subsidy, the long-run growth
rate, Y s, is strictly positive if and only if
 > 1 + (1  )(1  s) ln+ 
L
b ln  
 ^s(; s):
Apparently, we have ^s(; 0) = ^(). The assumption ln > b=L ensures @^s(; s)=@s <
0. In addition, we have lims!1 ^s(; s) = 1 < . Then, for any  that satises
ln > b=L, there exists a unique s^ 2 [0; 1) such that we have ^s(; s) <  for s 2 (s^; 1).
We can conclude that if s and  satisfy s 2 (s^; 1) and  2 (^s(; s); ], perpetual growth
can be sustained even if  is relatively small and there is a medium level of resource
intensity in goods production.
7 R&D Activities that Need Exhaustible Resource
Our results such that \relatively strong IPR protection is needed for perpetual growth
when the resource intensity of goods production is suciently low" may depend on
our assumption that the only input in R&D activities is labor. In this section, we
modify our model so that the exhaustible resource is needed for R&D activities. For our
purposes, we assume that the nal good is used as an input in the R&D sector. Then,
the labor market equilibrium conditions, (11), is replaced by L = (1  )Yt=(wt). The
output of the nal good sector is written as Yt = e
Qt AL1 Rt where eQt  e
R 1
0 ln qj;tdj .
Because the exhaustible resource is used in goods production, the R&D activities requires
the exhaustible resource. Here, we retain the notations used in the benchmark model,
wherever possible.
To conduct R&D activities with the intensity t, an R&D rm must devote bXttdt
units of the nal for a time interval of dt, where Xt > 0 is the R&D diculty. Then, the
nal good market equilibrium condition and the free entry condition of the R&D sector,
(9), are, respectively, given by
Yt = ct + bXtt; (22)
vt  (1  s)bXt; with equality if t > 0; (23)
where s 2 [0; 1) is the R&D subsidy rate. As in Segerstrom (1998), Xt evolves according
to
_Xt = Xt;  > 0: (24)
We rst consider the economy where the exhaustible resource is not essential for
goods production and R&D activities,  = 0. Suppose ln =  and the subsidy rate, s,
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is suciently close to zero. The condition ln =  ensures the existence of the steady
state where t is constant over time. In Appendix, we show that the positive output
growth is possible, if the next inequality is satised:
1  1


eQ0L=X0
(1  s)b > : (25)
The economy is always on the steady state equilibrium, where the R&D intensity is
given by
 =

1  1

eQ0L=X0
(1 s)b   
1 + (   1) > 0: (26)
The output growth rate is equal to  > 0.
We nally consider the economy where the exhaustible resource is not essential for
goods production and R&D activities,  > 0. Appendix shows that only when all of
the following three conditions are satised, there exists an equilibrium where perpetual
growth is possible:
1 > 1= > s( 0); (27)
ln   > (   1)(> 0); (28)
S0 =
ln  [1 + (   1)]
(ln  )

(1  s)b
1  1=
ln  + 
ln  [1 + (   1)]
X0
eQ0L1 
 1

: (29)
In the equilibrium where perpetual growth is possible, the R&D intensity is given by
t =

ln  [1 + (   1)]   > 0; (30)
and the output growth rate is  > 0. The growth rate is independent of labor supply
L. Hence, the scale eects are absent. More importantly,  and s have no eects on .
If any of the above conditions are not satised, no R&D activities are conducted in
equilibrium. Because the resource scarcity cannot be overcome, the output growth rate
becomes negative. Among the three conditions, the third condition, (29), is especially
knife-edge. If the government sets  and s that do not satisfy (29), the economy ends
up to contract. The policy maker has no room to control  and s freely. Hence, in the
model where the exhaustible resource is essential for R&D activities, we cannot examine
the relationship between the resource intensity and the IPR protection policy. What is
more, the rst condition, (27), implies that the right-hand side of (29) is strictly positive.
Hence, if the initial stock of the exhaustible resource S0 is suciently small, (29) can
never be satised and perpetual growth cannot be realized in the long-run whatever 
and s the government chooses.
8 Conclusion
We constructed an endogenous growth model with vertical innovations and investigated
whether IPR protection policies could sustain perpetual growth in the presence of ex-
haustible resources. We rst consider the model where labor is the only input in the
R&D activities. We nd that R&D activities would not take place if IPR protection were
suciently weak. The IPR protection required to sustain perpetual output growth is
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relatively weak (strong) for a more (less) resource-intensive economy because of smaller
(larger) costs of R&D activities. When the quality improvements brought about by in-
novations are suciently small and there is a medium level of resource intensity in goods
production, even the strictest IPR protections cannot sustain perpetual growth. We de-
rive the socially optimal level of output growth and nd that IPR protection should be
stronger as an economy becomes more resource-intensive. If the exhaustible resource is
essential for the R&D activities, perpetual growth cannot be realized in the long-run
when the initial stock of the exhaustible resource is suciently small.
Appendix for Section 7
From (12) and Yt = e
Qt AL1 Rt , we have _Rt=Rt = _Yt=Yt   rt and _Yt=Yt = t ln  
 _Rt=Rt. Using these two equations, we obtain
_Yt
Yt
=
t ln  rt
1   ; and
_Rt
Rt
=
t ln  rt
1   : (31)
Dene c^t  ct=Yt, yt  Yt=Xt, and zt  vt=Xt  (1  s)b. Note that we have t = (>)0
if zt < (=)(1  s)b from (23). We can derive the following equations.
t = (yt   c^t)=b; (32)
_^ct = (rt     t)c^t=; (33)
_yt = [ln  (1  )]t   t)yt=(1  ); (34)
_zt = [rt + (1  )t]zt   (1  1=) yt: (35)
Further, it is shown that rt satises
rt =
(
(1 )
1+( 1) ; if zt < (1  s)b;
(  1)t + (1  1=) yt(1 s)b ; if zt = (1  s)b;
(36)
When zt < (1  s)b, we have t = 0 and yt = c^t. Then, we have _Yt=Yt =  rt=(1 ) =
(rt )= = _ct=ct, which yields the rst line of (36). When zt = (1 s)b, we have _zt = 0.
From (35), we obtain the second line of (36).
We now consider the economy where exhaustible resource is not needed for produc-
tion and R&D activities and hence  = 0 holds. We know from (32) that t becomes
constant when _Yt=Yt = _ct=ct = _Xt=Xt. To ensure _Yt=Yt = _Xt=Xt, we assume ln = .
Then, yt remains constant at y0(= Yt=Xt = e
Q0L=X0). If zt < (1   s)b, we have
_zt = zt   (1  1=) y0 from (35), (36), and  = t = 0. If (25) is satised, we have
_zt = zt   (1  1=) y0 < 0 for zt < (1  s)b. Then, there exists no steady state in this
case. If zt = (1  s)b, using (32), (33), and (36), we obtain
_^ct
c^t
=
1


[(1  )  1]t +

1  1


y0
(1  s)b   

=
1


(   1)+ 1
b
(c^t   y0) +

1  1


y0
(1  s)b   

: (37)
The second line of (37) monotonically increases with c^t. If (25) is satised, the second
line of (37) is positive at c^t = y0. After setting s = 0, we evaluate the second line of
(37) at c^t = 0.
1


 (   1)+ 1
b
y0 +

1  1


y0
b
  

=  y0
b
[(   1)+ 1=]   < 0:
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Then, if s 2 [0; 1) is suciently close to zero, _^ct = 0 has a unique solution, c^, that
satises 0 < c^ < y0. When c^t = c^, we have t =  > 0 from the rst line of (37),
where  is dened by (26). In equilibrium, we have at = vt and _at=at = _ct=ct = (rt  
)=. Then, it is easily shown that the transversality condition, limT!1 aT cT e T =
0, is satised in the steady state. There exists a unique steady state equilibrium. Because
(37) has an upward slope, the steady state is unstable. Hence, the economy is always
on the steady state equilibrium.
We next consider the case where exhaustible resource is essential for goods production
and R&D activities. In this case, 0 <   1 holds. We need not assume ln = . If
zt < (1   s)b, we have t = 0 and c^t = yt. From (33){(36), the following dierential
equations are derived:
_yt =   
1 + (   1)yt; (38)
_zt =
(1  )
1 + (   1)zt  

1  1


yt: (39)
Here, we omit the dierential equation for c^t because c^t = yt. zt are jump variables.
As we will see later, we have to treat yt as a predetermined variable. Panel (a) of
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of yt and zt. There exists a unique and stable steady state
where c^t = yt = zt = 0. We have to examine whether the transversality condition,
limT!1 aT cT e T = 0, is satised along the transition to the steady state. Note that
_at=at  _ct=ct  < 0 ensures the transversality condition. Remember _ct=ct = (rt )=.
We dene Zt  yt=zt. Note that at is equal to vt in equilibrium and Xt is constant
because t = 0. Then, we obtain _at=at = _vt=vt = _zt=zt = r  

1  1

Zt using (36) and
(39). Therefore, we have _at=at    _ct=ct    =  (1   1=)Zt. From (38) and (39), we
have _Zt =
h
(1  1=)Zt   1+( 1)
i
Zt. This equation tells us that along the transition
to the steady state, Zt remains constant at
(1 1=) 1
1+( 1) > 0. Then, we can conclude
_at=at    _ct=ct    =  (1   1=)Zt < 0; the transversality condition is satised. The
path that converges to (c^t; yt; zt) = (0; 0; 0) is equilibrium. In this equilibrium, no R&D
activities are conducted. The growth rate of per capita consumption is negative because
of the increasing resource scarcity.15 From the second equation of (31) and the rst line
of (36), we know that the resource input decreases at the rate of  =[1 + (   1)](
 ~gR). Then, from (2), R0 is uniquely determined: R0 = ~gRS0. Therefore, the initial
value, y0(= e
Q0L1 R0=X0), is also uniquely determined. We have to treat yt as a
predetermined variable.
[Figure 3]
If zt = (1   s)b, we can derive the following dierential equations using (32), (33),
(34), and (36):
_^ct =
c^t


[(1  )  1]t +

1  1


yt
(1  s)b   

;
_yt =
yt
1  

(ln  + )t   

1  1


yt
(1  s)b

;
15In this equilibrium, c^t = yt holds. Then, from (38), the growth rate of per capita consumption is
given by  =[1 + (   1)] < 0.
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where t is given by (32). The _^ct = 0 and _yt = 0 loci are, respectively, given by
c^ =
(   1)+ 1= s1 s
(   1)+ 1 y +
b
(   1)+ 1 ; (40)
c^ =
ln 
 +
1= s
1 s
ln 
 + 1
y: (41)
The intersection of these two loci is a candidate of the steady state equilibrium. In the
steady state, c^ must be smaller than y for  to be positive (see (32)). Then, the slope of
(41) must be smaller than one, which is ensured by (27) and (28). If (41) has a steeper
slope than (40), these two loci have a unique intersection, where both c^ and y are strictly
positive (see point A in panel (b) of Figure 3) The inequalities, (27) and (28), ensure
that (41) is steeper than (40). At point A, the R&D intensity and the output growth
rate are given by (30) and _ct=ct = _Yt=Yt =   g > 0, respectively. In addition, we
have
yt =

1  1

 1 (1  s)b[ln  + ]
ln  [1 + (   1)]  y > 0
c^t =
ln 
 +
1= s
1 s
ln 
 + 1
y  c > 0;
rt =
ln  (1  )

  r > 0;
_Rt
Rt
=  (ln  )   gR < 0:
The inequality, ln > [1 + (   1)], ensures ^ > 0, r^ > 0, and g^R > 0.
To examine whether point A in panel (b) of Figure 3 is equilibrium, we have to
consider the following two cases; (i) the economy is always on point A and (ii) the
economy gradually converges to point A. We rst consider the second case. As shown
in panel (b) of Figure 3, there is no transitional path that converges to point A if
zt = (1   s)b. Then, if there is a transitional path that converges to point A, it must
pass through the region where zt < (1  s)b holds. As discussed above, we have c^t = yt
if zt < (1  s)b. In contrast, c < y holds at point A because  > 0. Then, any path that
passes through the region where zt < (1   s)b cannot converges to point A. Therefore,
the second case cannot happen in equilibrium.
We next consider the rst case. Because the economy is always on point A, yt is
equal to y for all t  0. Solving y = yt(= eQt AL1 Rt =Xt) for Rt and substituting
t = 0, we obtain
R0 =

(1  s)b
1  1=
ln  + 
ln  [1 + (   1)]
X0
eQ0L1 
 1

: (42)
Then, we have
R1
0 Rd = R0=gR. The condition, (29), is equivalent to S0 = R0=gR.
Suppose that R0 is large enough to satisfy R0=gR > S0. Then, if the economy is
always on point A, the stock of resource becomes zero for a nite time period. This
cannot happen in equilibrium. Conversely, suppose that R0 is small enough to satisfy
R0=gR < S0. Then, if the economy is always on point A, the equilibrium condition (2) is
not satised. In other words, the transiversality condition, limT!1 ST = 0, is violated.
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Then, point A cannot be equilibrium. In sum, if (29) is not satised, the path that
converges to (c^t; yt; zt) = (0; 0; 0) is the only equilibrium. If (29) is satised, both point
A and the path that converges to (c^t; yt; zt) = (0; 0; 0) are equilibria. Only when all of
(27){(29) are satised, perpetual growth may be possible.
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Figure 1: Phase Diagrams
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Figure 2: Perpetual Growth
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(a) zt < (1  s)b (t = 0)
yt
Vt
0
(1  s)b
_yt = 0
_zt = 0
(b) zt = (1  s)b (t > 0)
yt
c^t
0
_^ct = 0
_yt = 0
A
Figure 3: Dynamics when exhaustible resource is needed for R&D activities
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